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EXECUTIVE/CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON IN A POST
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The demands placed upon the President and Congress in a post-Cold
War era are dramatically different and more complicated than in the Cold
War era. The policy-making environment has changed. Issues no longer
divide neatly into foreign and domestic policy contexts. Policy-making is
more complicated, in part, due to the blended international-domestic
context of issues which has implications for executive/legislative
relations.
While it is true that presidents can and will attempt to practice
domination of the Congress when making public policy, the nature of the
new environment makes it less likely that they will regularly succeed.
Because of the complexity of issues, there is a need to revisit the
mechanics of executive/legislative liaisons in this new era. This essay
represents such an attempt.
First, we examine the changes that impact presidential policy-making
in the post-Cold War era. Second, we review the ongoing debate in
presidential literature concerning executive dominance over the Congress.
Third, we briefly examine the modern history of
presidential/congressional foreign policy interactions and note changes in
these interactions. Fourth, we present a brief history of the White House
Congressional Liaison Office in both the Cold War and the post-Cold War
eras. We specifically examine and analyze the Carter and Clinton
administrations. Finally, we present a new working model of a post-Cold
War White House Congressional Liaison Office. This model views such
an office as playing an important role in executive/legislative strategy and
not merely functioning as a tactical offshoot for White House advisors.
THE NEW POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
The past thirty-five years have transformed the political environment
within which the modern presidency operates. During this period, the
United States found itself in the throes of almost constant social and
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political change. The modern Civil Rights movement virtually guaranteed
the political mobilization of African Americans. Sexual revolution forced
a change in the nation's mores and led to the mobilization of women as a
force in American politics. The 1970's ushered in a modem environmental
movement with its effects felt throughout the domestic political scene.
The Vietnam War and subsequent international economic disturbances,
especially concerning energy issues, led to a sense of diminished
American optimism in both public and private institutions. 192 During the
same time, the foreign policy consensus constructed upon the containment
of communism began to unravel. When the Cold War ended, and with it
the doctrine of containment, the centerpiece of America's post World War
II national security policy became outdated almost overnight. 193 The
policy of detente in the 1970's might have contributed to Gorbachev's
reforms in the 1980's.
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Simultaneously, the increasing interdependence of the world's
economies brought forward a new series of international actors and policy
challenges. 195 Perhaps the greatest challenge remains the preservation of
domestic democratic traditions and institutions while coping with an
unstable international arena, where formerly autocratic states grapple with
democracy. At least one scholar has asked if democracy can adapt and
survive in such a transnational milieu.
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These domestic and international changes are social, cultural,
economic, and political in nature, and they have had a profound impact
upon our governing structures. During the past thirty-five years we have
witnessed an increase in what Theodore Lowi termed interest group
liberalism. 197 The demand side of American politics has become
fragmented by the growth of interest groups, Political Action Committees
(PAC), and interest research foundations. 198 Simultaneously, political
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parties, long the arbiters on the demand side of politics, have become
weaker and less effective as conduits for the policy desires of citizens.
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There is, of course, debate within both interest group and political
party literature because not everyone agrees that interest groups are a
powerful and growing phenomenon in American politics.20 0 Likewise, not
everyone agrees that American political parties are in decline.
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Despite opposing viewpoints, there is no denying the fragmentation
problem that special interest politics presents for presidents in times of
great national debt. The same problem also affects party cohesion when
making difficult and unpleasant budget decisions.
20 2
Beyond the divisive effect of interest groups in the 1970's, new
campaign finance laws were introduced that had the effect of emphasizing
the financial power of interest groups and their associated PACs at the
expense of political parties during a political campaign.20 3 Indeed,
campaign finance reform was one direct result of the 1970's Watergate
political scandals.
Watergate itself had profound effects upon the fragmenting of
executive/legislative relations. In the early 1970's many predominately
young liberals were elected to Congress. They were concerned about the
abuse of power in the Nixon White House, but were initially relatively
powerless in Congress. Their aim was to increase their power in Congress
and then enact reforms to bring executive/legislative relations back to
some semblance of balance.
These young representatives and senators achieved their goal of
increasing their power by expanding the subcommittee structure to spread
power in both Houses more evenly, 20 4 thus, showing their willingness to
confront modern presidents in both domestic and foreign policy.
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Although, the young representatives and senators achieved their goal of
regaining a balance of power, it is shortsighted to argue that this
congressional reassertion of power alone caused a new
executive/legislative relationship. A more appropriate conclution is that
the post-Nixon Congress reflected the general changes occurring in
society and the ultimate result of these changes was a more competitive
relationship between the President and the Congress.
These social, cultural, economic, and political changes occurred amid
tremendous technological changes in our society. During this time the
United States entered the computer age. New communication technologies
such as cable, satellite television, and video taping affected how the public
received the news and how politicians conducted their campaigns. In the
1970's, Congress, itself, embarked upon the computer age. Of all the
reforms that Congress initiated, none was more powerful than its own
computerization, which balanced the information flow between the
executive and legislative branches.20 5 Computerization also captured the
essence of the more competitive executive/legislative relationship.
One can argue whether the War Powers Act or the Budget
Impoundment Control Act increased or decreased presidential or
congressional powers. One can argue whether any of the congressional
reforms from the 1970's forced a more competitive executive/legislative
relationship. These arguments, however, would fail to capture the main
reason behind increased executive/legislative competition: that of a more
balanced competition for information between the two branches. All of
this has impacted the presidency and presidential policy-making.
PRESIDENTIAL OR CONGRESSIONAL POLICY DOMINANCE?
The American presidency during the Cold War period exhibited
characteristics rooted in Hamiltonian thought. The Cold War era
presidency favored a strong executive because, as Hamilton noted,
"Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks. "
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The most influential Cold War scholar espousing the acquisition,
maintenance, and use of personal presidential power was Richard
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Neustadt in his classic work, Presidential Power. 20 7 Neustadt favored
activist presidents who acquired and used power to achieve their public
policy agendas. During the Cold War period, concentration of power
preserved and protected national security interests. Such a model for
governing seemed to fit American national security needs.20 8 The Vietnam
War and the subsequent governmental scandals under the rubric of
Watergate seemed to illustrate just where such a model of presidential
government could lead. Congress moved to reassert a balance of power
quickly so that, even by 1975, the Academy of Political Science entitled
its annual proceedings Congress Against the President. 20 9 Thus, a great
debate ensued over the wisdom of congressionally balancing presidential
power. So great was the concern over the Congressional reassertion of
power, that by the 1980's some scholars and commentators were warning
not of an imperial presidency but of an imperiled presidency. Thomas
Cronin noted:
Such defenders of a powerful presidency as Samuel
Huntington and columnist Robert Novack wondered how a
government could conduct a coherent foreign policy if
legislative ascendancy really meant the development of a
Congress into a second United States government. Could
the United States afford to have two foreign policies? A
nation cannot long retain a leadership role in the world
unless its own leadership is both clear and decisive. They
argued, too, that congressional decisions - including foreign
policy decisions - must be based entirely on domestic
politics, which is why Congress cannot conduct foreign
policy.
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The congressional reforms of the 1970's have touched off an explosive
debate within political literature over two issues: (1) whether
congressional restraints encumber the modern presidency, and (2) just
what such a situation meant for governing. Some scholars have noted that
the only way a modern president can govern effectively is with the
consent and prior consultation of the Congress across the policy spectrum.
Such consultation might imply the institution of a parliamentary
system.2 11 Other scholars have argued for a multi-party system of
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competitive elections as a safeguard against unbridled executive power.212
Still others have argued that despite the congressional reforms of the
1970's nothing much has changed; and that the President is still the
dominant actor in the public policy system especially in foreign affairs.
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As Paul E. Peterson stated:
• . . [T]he changes in American politics during the post-
Vietnam era did not eliminate the distinction between
foreign and domestic political arenas - primarily because
the nature of the international system precludes it. To
respond to external threats, the United States needs a
relatively centralized, coordinated foreign policy-making
system. Because of this international reality, presidents
remain the most potent political force in the making of
foreign policy. Though Congress began to play a more
important role in the years following the Vietnam War,
especially when the executive's capacity to defend the
national interest was diminished, the primary locus of
decision making remained in presidential hands.
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Peterson notes in his article the debate surrounding presidential power.
For example, Peterson points out President Bush's apparent foreign policy
triumphs during the Persian Gulf War, including his domination of
Congress during the Persian Gulf War. However, while Bush essentially
got what he wanted during the war, the conduct of the war was tempered
not only by the memory of Vietnam, but by the close vote in the Senate.
The Senate essentially informed the President that it would not support a
long and protracted war. One could argue that the conduct of the war
reflected not presidential dominance but Congress reaction to presidential
moves.
As another example, Peterson mentions the Reagan Administration's
successful conclusion of the START and INF arms negotiations. Similar
to the tone-setting role Congress played in the Persian Gulf War, Congress
aided in forcing the President to begin negotiations with the Soviets.
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Even today there are warnings concerning the effect of Congress on
START I and START II. While the present Congress wants to disregard
the ABM Treaty, Michael Krepon has expressed concern about the effects
of such a move upon both START I and START 11.216
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When one considers domestic issues, such as the budget,
executive/legislative complexities also arise. In 1974, Congress took back
some budget power with the institution of the Budget Impoundment
Control Act. This Act effectively disallowed presidential
impoundments of congressionally authorized monies. 218 It also set up a
strict process of rescissions and deferrals.219  Ever since the
implementation of this reform there has been a lack of
executive/legislative consensus over budgeting issues, resulting in
strategies like Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 220 If anyone believes in
presidential dominance regarding budget issues, one need look no farther
than the 1990 budget summit and compromise which many observers
believe cost President Bush the 1992 election.
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Things have not changed much under the Clinton Administration.
During the summer of 1995, the Administration found itself responding to
Republican budget initiatives. Such proposals challenge the old notion
that the president proposes and the Congress disposes of budget
initiatives. Ann Devroy notes:
[I]n the end, the [P]resident may have little leverage to do
more than slow down and temper the Republican direction.
"We are dealing with a work product that is written from
their perspective, not ours," said White House press
secretary Michael McCurry. He said Clinton cannot change
the Republican direction - and in some cases, agrees with it
- but he can sand off the rough edges and preserve and
protect some pieces of his agenda.
222
Ms. Devroy's assessment comes just five years after most budget
scholars argued that the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act would increase the
President's budget powers. Thurber and Durst concluded, "[U]nder the
1990 budget agreement, Congress has abdicated its role as guardian of the
purse and has lost some of its ability to make policy in favor of a more
congenial budget process." 223 The current political process, however, is
subject to quick changes. The Republican control of Congress after the
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1994 midterm elections is a case in point. This shift in party control of
Congress has led to the budget predicament in the Clinton Administration
and has tempered even the most certain of the scholarly budget
predictions.
Whether the President is dominant in the policy process is important in
deciding what future presidents should do to achieve the goals of their
parties' platform or their personal agenda. If the presidency maintains its
autonomy, perhaps future presidents only need better political strategies or
more determined presidential will. If, on the other hand, the
executive/congressional policy environment has become more balanced
and competitive, then the modern President needs more effective tools
aimed at inter-branch cooperation. On paper the tools of the modem
presidency seem formidable, but in practice a more balanced view is in
order.
PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY
INTERACTION
A closer examination of post World War II presidential-congressional
policy interaction in the area of foreign affairs sheds light on the debate
over the extent to which the President dominates the policy-making
process. In no policy area is the claim to presidential dominance made
more forcefully than it is in foreign affairs. Yet, if we look closely, we
find that broad assertions of presidential dominance or decline confuse
more than they enlighten. What emerges is a great deal of variation in
presidential-congressional relations; variation that requires a managerial
capacity at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue if issues are to be dealt with
quickly and effectively. By examining presidential-congressional relations
from three different perspectives, one gains an appreciation of the extent
to which variations in these relations invalidate claims of presidential or
congressional dominance.
DIFFERENCES OVER TIME
First, one can trace variations in presidential-congressional relations
over time. Particularly enlightening is Frans Bax's account of these
relations from the beginning of the Cold War through the end of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, a period identified as one of presidential
dominance.
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Bax argues that, from 1943 to 1950-51, a period of presidential-
congressional accommodation existed. This state of relations was noted
for the close consultation between the two branches brought on by the
Republican dominated Congress' refusal to accept presidential
dominance. 225 The issue which ignited this Republican rebellion was
Roosevelt's plan to act on the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration via executive agreement. Led by Senator Arthur
Vandenberg, Republicans forced Roosevelt to submit the UNRRA
program to Congress for its approval.226
A different presidential-congressional relationship existed between
1951-1955. Antagonism, more than presidential dominance, marked this
period. Foreign policy issues such as Republican accusations that Truman
administration lost China and mismanaged the Korean War, played a
major role in the 1952 presidential campaign. More than partisan politics
was involved in the presidential-congressional antagonistic relationship.
Institutional rivalries were also present, as evidence by Republican and
Democratic support for the Bricker amendment. The Bricker amendment,
if passed, would have limited a president's power to use executive
agreements to evade congressional disapproval of foreign policy
initiatives.
Presidential-congressional relations took on still a different quality
over the next ten years. From the mid-1950's until the mid-1960's,
Congress was essentially a passive player that did little more than
legitimize presidential foreign policy decisions. Bax defines this period as
one of acquiescence. The President dominated foreign policy and
consultation with Congress on foreign policy was rare.
The lesson learned from the presidential domination of Congress is the
three-part foundation on which congressional acquiescence to presidential
foreign policy leadership rested. First, the basic legislation necessary for
the President to pursue a foreign policy of containment was already
established. Most foreign policy undertakings did not need Congressional
approval. Second, a consensus existed that containment was the correct
foreign policy for the United States so there was little reason to challenge
the President. Disagreements were largely over the details of
implementing containment, and these questions were thought best left to
the discretion of the executive branch.227 Third, Congress considered itself
inferior to the President in terms of its competence to deal with foreign
policy matters. If these truly are the foundations on which presidential
dominance is built, the prospects for continued (or renewed) presidential
dominance in the post Cold War era seems slight.
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Following the period of presidential dominance, presidential-
congressional relations entered a period of ambiguity. Congress as an
institution remained compliant. Individual members of Congress,
however, began to voice opposition to presidential dominance in foreign
policy. The most visible opponent was Senator William Fulbright, who
used his position on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold
hearings questioning U.S. policy on Vietnam. Conservative opposition
also emerged. Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee
publicly argued that the President was not using enough military force to
win the war in Vietnam.
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As the Vietnam War dragged on, and American involvement became
deeper and more controversial, presidential-congressional relations
became increasingly acrimonious. Instead of individuals challenging
presidential foreign policy dominance, Congress as an institution moved
against the President. The Congressional challenge had less to do with the
content of the President's policy (over which they remained divided) than
it did with the constitutionality of his actions. Bax argues that this
constitutional challenge is a legacy of the earlier period of acquiescence
and the breakdown in presidential-congressional consultative
mechanisms.22 9 Viewed in this light, not only are the preconditions for
presidential dominance difficult to achieve, but presidential dominance
itself may be undesirable because of the problems it creates once it is no
longer present.
DIFFERENCE WITHIN A POLICY AREA
Insight into the reality of presidential dominance over Congress in
making foreign policy is gained by tracing one issue over time. Paul
Stockton has done so for the military budget. 30 His study suggests a need
to rethink our ideas about congressional activism in this area, and, by
extension, to rethink our ideas about the challenge confronting presidents
who wish to dominate the foreign policy decision-making process.
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The standard complaint of critics regarding congressional involvement
in defense budgetary matters is Congress proclivity to engage in
"micromanagement. 232 Driven by a desire to protect constituent interests
and bolster their prospects for reelection, Congress traditionally focuses
228 Id.
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Military, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 233 (1995).231 1d. at 234.
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on the minutia of the defense budget rather than its strategic underpinning.
Concern for where money is spent and who benefits from a defense
appropriation drive out concern for why the money is being spent or how
a particular weapons system fits into the overall U.S. national security
strategy. Many commentators add that the very structure of Congress, its
system of committees and subcommittees with overlapping jurisdictions,
and the political nature of the decision-making process is an almost
insurmountable barrier to any form of strategic input by Congress.
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Stockton notes that in spite of the continuance of these incentives,
Congress has begun to show a willingness and ability to move beyond
micromanagement. No longer is its attention solely directed to the details
of the military budget. Also being scrutinized are the premises and
strategies behind spending requests. In 1990, Senator Sam Nunn of the
Senate Armed Services Committee spoke directly to the need of
reorienting American military policy.2 3 Two years later, Congressman
Les Aspin of the House Armed Services Committee issued a set of
proposals on restructing American military forces.235 Republican Senators
John Warner and William Cohen also have offered plans for reshaping
U.S. forces in the post-Cold War world.236 Finally, Senator Robert Dole
and Congressman Leon Pannetta used their positions as chairs of the
Senate and House Budget Committees to hold hearings on defense
strategy and force posture issues.2
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Congress' changing orientation in the politics of passing military
budgets is significant for those who think of presidential-congressional
relations in terms of presidential dominance. Traditional congressional
micromanagement of the military budget did not threaten presidential
dominance because details of policy rather than the policy itself was being
scrutinized. Moreover, in dispensing budgetary favors, the President was
in a position to gain as much political benefit from the construction of
additional aircraft, ships, or missiles as were members of Congress.238 The
new version of congressional micromanagement cuts to the heart of the
question of who dominates the policy process. At stake is the ability to
decide the basic outline of American defense policy for decades.
Not only have the stakes been raised by this new micromanagement,
but the techniques used by presidents to ensure domination of the policy
process may be far less effective. Increased spending on pet military
projects - an activity that fits in well with the traditional
233 Id. at 236.234 Id. at 238.
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micromanagement outlook of Congress - was a heavily relied upon
instrument of presidential dominance.2 39 Kennedy helped assure the
passage of the Limited Test Ban Treaty by providing funds for additional
underground tests; possibly allowing atmospheric tests if the Soviet Union
broke the terms of the treaty; and maintain modem nuclear weapons'
laboratories. According to Nixon's Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird,
the price for Senate approval of the SALT I Treaty was funding for the
Trident submarine program, the B-I bomber, sea-launched cruise missiles,
and other strategic defenses that were permissible under the ABM
Treaty. President Carter sought to ensure Senate support for SALT II by
going ahead with a version of the IX missile system, a futuristic bomber,
long-range theater nuclear forces, and new cruise missiles.2 4 ' Each of
these programs became lines in a budget that Congress expected to exert
significant control over in the future.
A shift of some in Congress from budgetary micromanagement to
strategic micromanagement also reduces the effectiveness of these
traditional strategies because it does not address the core issues of this
new group. The demand for strategic input is not likely to be mollified by
a strategy that promises only periodic or one-time consultation. Such was
the case in SALT I when the Nixon administration agreed that in SALT II
the number of weapons each side would be allowed to retain would be
made part of the treaty rather than placed in an executive agreement.
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Strategic input is an ongoing process and requires continuous
consultation. Those in Congress seeking to influence strategic choices are
likely to demand a mechanism for doing so as the price for their
cooperation.
DIFFERENCES WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION
Finally, problems with characterizing presidential-congressional
relations cast in terms of presidential dominance come into focus when
examining in detail each administration's relations with Congress. Bruce
Jentleson has done this for the Reagan administration and a single
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descriptive phase cannot capture the complexity that emerges. 243 Jentleson
found four distinct patterns to presidential-congressional relations during
those eight years: confrontation, institutional competition, constructive
promises, and bipartisan cooperation. 244 First, presidential-congressional
relations during the Reagan administration were characterized by
confrontation. Most prominent among these issues were regional conflicts
involving Nicaragua, South Africa, and arms sales to Saudi Arabia.2
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Jentleson characterized the second set of issues as involving institutional
competition. Issues decided by institutional competition centered on State
Department authorization bills and foreign aid legislation. 246 Presidential-
congressional relations were also characterized by constructive
compromises. Jentleson cites military aid for El Salvador and the
leadership crisis in the Philippines as prime examples of constructive
compromise. 247 Finally, foreign policy issues were dealt with in a
framework of bipartisan cooperation exemplified by relations with the
Soviet Union and China and the use of military force against aggressor
states in regional conflicts.248 This bipartisan spirit, however, emerged late
in the Reagan Administration.
The presence of multiple patterns of presidential-congressional
relations in the foreign policy area within a single administration speaks
against continued reliance on traditional types of coordination devices in
dealing with Congress. No longer can the State Department, Defense
Department, or National Security advisors be expected to be the
instruments of coordination between the White House and Congress. No
matter how many congressional briefings they give, reports they write, or
questions they answer, these organizations are more outward than inward
looking in how they define their tasks. They continue to operate by a
decision-making logic rooted in notions of presidential dominance. The
highest priority is assigned to composing solutions to foreign policy
problems, and only then is support sought from Congress.
Maneuvering through many and constantly changing patterns of
presidential-congressional interaction requires proactive attention from
executive branch officials who are knowledgeable in both foreign and
domestic policy. A substantial role for Congress in making foreign policy
is now something that is taken for granted. None of the foundations of
presidential dominance in the 1960's remain in place. There is no foreign
policy consensus; the international environment and broadened foreign
243 Bruce W. Jentleson, American Diplomacy: Around the World and Along Pennsylvania
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policy agenda have forced presidents to obtain congressional approval for
their most important foreign policy initiatives. Adding to the imperative of
bringing both foreign policy and domestic political expertise to the White
House end of the communication link between the two branches is the
extent to which foreign policy decisions are now made against a backdrop
of interest group activity.
What is most urgently needed is to "institutionalize the practice of
early and genuine consultation with congressional leaders."249 A potential
vehicle for realizing this goal currently exists; the White House
Congressional Liaison Office.
WHITE HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON:
A BRIEF HISTORY
Abraham Holtzman notes the importance of the executive/legislative
liaison in his 1970 classic work, Legislative Liaison: Executive
Leadership in Congress.250 The subtitle is intriguing, for Holtzman
approached the subject during the Cold War period from a presidential
perspective. He interviewed many congressional liaison officers in the
White House and throughout the executive bureaucracies. He concluded
that what was new about the executive/legislative liaison was "[t]he
increasing importance and recognition afforded legislative liaison as a
special aspect of executive leadership," and "[t]he shifting of
responsibility for liaison from a defuse and diverse set of actors to a
particular set of actors."251 Holtzman was referring to high level actors
within the bureaucracies of government, but he also discussed liaison from
the White House perspective. Thus, even at the height of the Cold War,
legislative liaison was recognized as contributing to a president's powers
and leadership skills. In a post Cold War era legislative liaison arguably
will become even more imperative given the nature of power diffusion in
the modern Congress.
From the perspective of the White House Congressional Liaison
Office, the history of effectiveness in executive/legislative liaison has
been spotty. Scholars George C. Edwards and Stephen J. Wayne have
shown that executive/legislative liaison occurred in three stages.
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Beginning in the Eisenhower Administration with executive officials wary
of infringing upon congressional prerogatives, the White House
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congressional relations office was small and utilized tactics of gentle and
indirect persuasion rather than tough, direct lobbying.
The second phase occurred in the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations.
The office expanded as did its functions. The agenda during these
Administrations was quite comprehensive. In addition, these
Administrations reached out to Congress to incorporate legislative views
into executive policy decisions. Lobbying became more persistent,
generating both rewards and deprivations.
2 5 3
The third phase began in the Carter Administration. After their second
year, the staff of the White House Office of Congressional Relations was
increased with a goal toward bolstering legislative support for the
President's proposals. Computers now tracked legislation. President Carter
interjected himself directly into legislative lobbying efforts. A public
liaison office was established to link grass roots support to the President's
programs in the Congress.
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The Reagan Administration continued these efforts and added a
legislative strategy group consisting of senior political aides coordinated
by the White House Chief of Staff.2 5 5 Generally, from the period of
Eisenhower to Clinton, the White House legislative liaison effort's
produced staffing and undertook a more sophisticated and professional
lobbying of Congress.
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But how effective were these Administrations, i.e., Carter to Clinton,
in their legislative liaison efforts? We first present a brief overview of
these Administrations and then compare and contrast the Carter
Administration with the Clinton Administration.
The Carter administration began with absolutely atrocious relations
with the Congress. Congressional leaders were skeptical of Carter's
knowledge of the Washington political system, and key White House
aides were skeptical of the Washington establishment.25 7 Generally the
executive/legislative liaison effort during the first two years of the Carter
Administration was considered to be ineffective by most congressional
observers. 25 8 However, there was an attempt to learn and the last two
years were somewhat more productive.
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The first Reagan Administration, in contrast to Carter's, staffed the
White House Congressional Liaison Office with a wealth of veterans in
congressional relations. Max Friedersdorf, Chief White House lobbyist,
had served as a White House congressional liaison officer for President
Ford and had significant experience in the Congress as a Republican
administrative assistant. Others, like Powel Moore, David Swanson, and
William Gribbin, had all been associated with the staffs of
Congresspeople and Senators or key committees of Congress. Kenneth
Duberstein, who in the beginning of the Administration was appointed as
chief House lobbyist and later became chief White House lobbyist, had
ties to Senator Jacob Javits of New York.259 Through the efforts of these
people, the Reagan Administration, unlike President Carter, achieved
early legislative success, particularly with the 1981 economic program.
Support for the Reagan Administration's policy agenda declined after
1982, mirroring his declining political support in the Congress.
Nevertheless, it appears that one criterion for early success is significant
Washington experience on a president's legislative liaison team.
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The Bush Administration, in comparison, appointed relatively
inexperienced people to the White House lobbying posts. Many of them
had experience in private industry, although in a federal lobbying
261
capacity.
E. Boyd Hollingsworth, the Deputy Assistant for Legislative Affairs,
and John W. Howard, Special Assistant to the President for Legislative
Affairs in the House of Representatives, both had significant legislative
experience coming respectively from the offices of Senator Alan Simpson
and Senator Trent Lott.262 This team's baptism of fire was the disastrous
Tower nomination for Secretary of Defense.
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In addition, the Bush Administration appointed John Sununu as White
House Chief of Staff. Mr. Sununu had a horrendous relationship with
Congress, particularly with the Democratic leadership. In this and other
mistakes were shades of the early Carter Administration.264 Eventually
President Bush had to replace his outspoken Chief of Staff.265 The Bush
Administration's forays into executive/legislative liaison display the
importance of a White House Chief of Staffs relationship with Congress.
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The Clinton Administration appointed Howard Paster as head of the
White House Office of Legislative Affairs. He had a staff of
approximately twenty people, including eleven directly involved in
lobbying the Congress. Paster was a former United Auto Workers, (UAW)
lobbyist. 266 Susan Brophy, Deputy Assistant to the President and directly
below Paster in the chain of command, had experience in the office of
Senator Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.) and in the Democratic National
Committee. 67 Lorraine Miller, in charge of House lobbying, worked for
House Speakers Foley and Wright and Representative John Lewis (D-
Ga.).268 On the Senate side, Steve Ricchetti's resume includes lobbying for
Blue Cross/Blue Shield. He was also associated with the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), which successfully negotiated
NAFTA and the President's economic program during the first year of the
Clinton Administration.269 The DSCC, however, was criticized for
alienating conservative Democrats, ignoring Republicans, and being slow
to respond to members' concerns and requests for information.
When Howard Paster resigned at the end of 1993, he was replaced by
Pat Griffin.270 As of early 1994, the White House Legislative Affairs
Office was staffed by eighteen people.271 The importance of hiring
experienced personnel to act as legislative\executive liaisons may be a
significant lesson that future presidents would do well to heed.
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
The perception of the Carter Administration as a novice in the ways of
the Washington political scene is well established. Dan Caldwell relates
the following as typical in the early Carter Administration:
[T]hings got off to a bad start from day one. Tip O'Neill,
then Speaker of the House, went to an inaugural party at
the Kennedy Center. He had told Hamilton Jordan that he
needed a number of tickets for his wife and family. When
he appeared on the stage with President Carter, he looked
for his family members in the first rows and then in the
orchestra section of the Kennedy Center, but he didn't see
them and just assumed that he had missed them. It turned
out that they were in the last balcony and one of the last
rows of the Kennedy Center. So, Tip O'Neill had no love
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lost for Hamilton Jordan from the very beginning of the
Carter Administration.
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Complicating this type of emerging relationship between the White House
and the Congressional leadership was the staff appointed to the Carter
Office of Congressional Relations. Again, Caldwell notes:
In interviews I conducted with senators and Senate staff
members, the Office of Congressional Relations in the
White House was almost uniformly given bad marks.
Apparently, the office was simply not adept in dealing with
senators. Most of those who staffed the Office of
Congressional Relations came with President Carter from
Georgia and didn't have the Washington experience. They
didn't know the arcane ways in which Washington and the
U.S. Senate operate, and consequently, this did not help the
[P]resident in his efforts to ratify SALT 11.
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To be fair to President Carter, the first two years were a learning
experience. Many observers agree that during the second two years of his
Administration President Carter became a more effective congressional
lobbyist. 274 However, this may have been too late, for, as Paul Light has
noted, all presidents become more effective when their political capital
and hence influence is declining.
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One of Carter's immediate problems was the appointment of Frank
Moore as head of the Carter Office of Congressional Relations. Frank
Moore was national finance director for the Carter campaign and the
Deputy Director for the south-east states. By his own admission he was an
outsider to the Hill.276 Moore started his lobbying efforts with only four or
five people. Three people on the House side and two on the Senate.
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Only three of these staffers had significant congressional experience:
Danny Tate, Robert Thompson, and William H. Cable. 278 This was hardly
enough help when one considers that the Carter Administration was the
first Administration to deal with the modem fragmented, subcommittee
driven, Congress. Frank Moore was a genial person but Bob Beckel, who
later came over from the State Department to lobby for the Panama Canal
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Treaty, believed that Moore was in the wrong position when it came to
foreign policy questions.
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By 1978 Vice President Mondale had reviewed Moore's lobbying
operation and suggested an increase in staff.280 Veterans of the
Washington establishment were added, and the clerical staff increased. By
the end of the Administration, the staff had grown to approximately forty.
In addition, the President became a more active lobbyist for his
programs.
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Executive branch reluctance to consult with the Congress before
presidential initiatives were announced negatively effected early lobbying
efforts. Bert Carp, Vice President Mondale's chief legislative policy
advisor, noted that congressional liaisons got involved only after
presidential initiatives were sent to the Hill.28 2 This put the legislative
liaisons at a disadvantage, for they had to lobby for a program that they
had not participated in developing to a Congress that had minimal
participation in the construction of such programs and policies. A few
years after his tenure in the Carter Administration, Bob Becked observed:
"We certainly learned from [SALT II] that the less the Congress knows
about foreign policy initiatives, the more they're kept in the dark about the
negotiations, and the less they're consulted, the more difficult the mission
of ratification or passage becomes." 28 3 To the Carter Administration's
credit, it established a congressional observers group at the strategic arms
limitation negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. 284 This was
viewed as a necessary first step in including certain members of Congress
to these delicate policy negotiations.
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A related problem was the reluctance of officials in the Carter
Administration to include Republicans in their negotiations. After his
tenure in the Carter Administration, Frank Moore observed that his office
and staff should have done more with the Republicans in Congress.
28 6
Mistakes were made by not working more closely with Republicans. He
suggested that one problem was manpower.28 7 There simply were not
enough people in the Congressional Relations Office. With respect to
Republicans, Moore said, "Cutting them in early on some of the
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consulting rhythm, putting in some stuff that's attractive to them in the bill
might work. And they just weren't even consulted on it .... ,,288 Bob
Becked also referred to Moore's indication that, if given a second
opportunity, he (Moore) might have gone to the Republican Minority
leader in the House, Bob Michael, and asked him to recommend a person
to be on the Congressional Relations Office staff specifically to deal with
Republican concerns.
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When President Carter came to office, he was reluctant to appoint a
powerful and authoritarian person as Chief of Staff due to the Haldeman
experience in the Nixon White House. However, President Carter's
appointment of Hamilton Jordan to a similar, if weakened, position was a
mistake. Jordan was from Georgia. He was not conversant in the ways of
Washington and he quickly developed a bad reputation on the Hill. This
strained executive/legislative relations at a fragile time early in the Carter
Administration's tenure was similar to the problem President Bush faced
with John Sununu.29°
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
When President Clinton was elected he immediately pledged to cut
government waste and unnecessary spending. He indicated that he would
begin by cutting the size and salaries of the White House staff, and he has
struggled to maintain his campaign pledge.291 While President Carter
started with only four congressional lobbyists, President Clinton's eleven
lobbyists, given the more demanding nature of the job and the changes in
Congress, is still an inadequate number. After Vice President Mondale's
1978 review, the Carter office increased its staff to seven lobbyists, which
means that the Clinton Presidency initiated its reign with only four more
congressional lobbyists than the Carter Administration. Remarkably,
President Clinton wanted to reduce the White House staff for much the
same reasons that drove the Carter Administration. Both Presidents felt
that the size of the presidential staff had bloated. In Clinton's case, there
was the desire to lead by example. If he were going to ask others to endure
painful budget cuts, then his own operation would suffer first. Leadership
for innovative policies and congressional lobbying must now come from
organizations that have to endure budget cuts which affect their ability to
lead on these issues. 292 The way around these problems, as the Carter
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Administration found, is to detail others from the various departments to
aid in the congressional lobbying effort.
The Clinton Administration has done a better job of hiring staff for
their Legislative Affairs Office with more Washington experience than the
legislative liaisons of the Carter staff. Although, Howard Paster, as
mentioned earlier, did not come directly from the Congress but from the
United Automobile Workers Union.
Another similar characteristic between the Carter and Clinton
Administrations is the strategy, at least under Paster, of excluding
Republicans from consultations. In addition, there has been the belief,
especially concerning Clinton's economic program, that Republicans
would not be of much help.293 In fact, Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole
has been quite candid with President Clinton on this point. This is a
situation that has particularly turned on the Clinton Administration which
now faces Republican control of both houses of Congress.
Another similarity between the Carter and Clinton Administrations is
the role of the White House Chief of Staff. Hamilton Jordan's early
relationship with the congressional leadership was horrible. Jordon was a
friend of President Carter who trusted and had confidence in him.
Likewise, Mac McLarty was a boyhood friend of President Clinton.294
Each believes the other knows what is in his heart. They are said to be
very close. As Jordan came from Georgia, McLarty came from Arkansas.
Neither Jordon nor McLarty were skilled in the ways of Washington
politics, and the Presidents were equally naive. Clinton was heard to
exclaim "I don't know this place [Congress]. 295 Both Chiefs of Staff
caused rifts between their Administration and Congress. In Clinton's case
the relationship between McLarty and Paster so deteriorated that Paster
resigned. Paster felt that McLarty was hindering the congressional
lobbying effort.296 McLarty was eventually replaced by Leon Panetta, a
veteran of many congressional budget wars.
A final similarity between the Carter and Clinton Administrations
concerns the use of the White House legislative lobbying operation. Both
Presidents have viewed this effort as tactical and not strategic; that is,
White House advisors set the strategy for policies and programs in the
Congress first and then engage the lobbying office. This office then plots
the proper legislative tactics for fulfilling the legislative strategy
developed by the advisors. Thus, in a sense, the White House Legislative
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Affairs Office is a tactical offshoot for the White House advisors. 297 This
has the effect of removing staffers who "know" Congress from strategic
policy development questions.
Similarities in presidential administrations twelve years apart point to
the lack of institutional learning from administration to administration.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
A NEW WORKING MODEL FOR EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE
RELATIONS
There are some general observations to be made concerning
executive/legislative liaison and then a few more specific suggestions
about developing a working model. Future presidents should understand
that executive/legislative liaison will be their most important job because
all presidential policy initiatives ultimately go through the Congress.
While all modern presidents have paid lip service to the Congress, they
have acted contrary. All too often campaign workers and friends with very
little professional experience of the workings of Congress have been
rewarded with high level White House offices. This must change if they
are to be successful at executive/legislative liaison. The nature of the
changes in domestic and world politics appears to indicate an increasing
importance for presidents to address executive/legislative liaison
appointment process professionally.
Future presidents should strive not to dominate the Congress but to
collaborate. Ideology is polarizing Congress, making collaboration and
accommodation more difficult; but this makes collaboration all the more
imperative. Without collaboration, future presidents will only be
marginally successful. Their only tools will be the legislative veto or
attempts to ram legislation through the Congress. They need to consult
and engage the Congress in the initial stages of the policy process; if not,
Congress will become obstructionist.
The President should recognize that his staff helps carry out the
presidential agenda. It is not the size of the staff that counts but the quality
of the staffers. Future presidents should try to staff their organizations
with people who know and understand the Congress. This should be a
priority in executive appointments. Norman Ornstein observed long ago
that:
The President will need a much strengthened congressional liaison staff
and greater coordination within the White House staff in order to maintain
leadership over the internally fragmented, activist, and lavishly staffed
legislative branch in the nineteen-eighties. As to strengthening of staff, the
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single greatest need will be to recruit individuals to the liaison staff, and
preferably to other senior staff posts as well, who are experienced in the
"legislative way of life" in Washington. 298 The White House Office of
Legislative Affairs should be increased in staff, and these staffers should
all have significant experience in the Congress. There simply is no time
for on the job learning in modern presidential administrations.
Presidents should strive to identify key individuals in the opposing
party that can work with on issues. This will be especially important
during times of divided government. Not all issues are ideologically
loaded. The identification of bridge issues where both parties' work
together may stimulate cooperation elsewhere in the policy process. The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) could serve as a model
here. 2
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Presidents should eschew the temptation to appoint a Chief of Staff
with little experience in legislative affairs. Jordan, Sununu, and MacLarty
should all serve to warn future occupants of the White House of the
dangers of basing appointments on friendship alone. A president's Chief
of Staff should ideally come from the Congress. To the extent that this
recommendation is followed, it will elevate and energize the
executive/legislative liaison effort.
Finally, in order for a more effective executive/legislative organization
to begin, structural change is necessary. John Mead Flanagin has
suggested a new staff structure for the White House arranged around four
main policy councils: Science and Technology, Security Policy, Economic
Policy, Domestic Policy.30 0 If these policy councils are begun, there
should be a presidential advisor for executive/legislative affairs authorized
to float between these policy councils to assess the viability of proposals
and policies as they relate to the Congress. In other words, the director of
the White House Legislative Affairs Office should be elevated to advisor
status. This will enable that office to play a strategic role in policy
development within the White House. Given such a structural change in
the White House, one wonders what the impact of this would have been
on President Clinton's health care proposals.
Elevating the role of executive/legislative liaison director would send a
message that the president is serious about executive/legislative
collaboration. This elevated position would serve as a tool to ease the
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collaboration. The development of these tools is necessary given the
changes in domestic and world politics. Modem presidents need help,
especially in times of divided government. A new working model of the
White House Office of Legislative Affairs should be constructed
incorporating these general considerations.
